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IMPROVISATION AS A CALL FOR COMMUNICATION*

Si un oiseau savait dire précisément ce qu'il chante,
pourquoi il le chante, et quoi, en lui, chante,
il ne chanterait pas
(Paul Valéry – Cahiers)

I shall show the cinders of my spirits
Through the ashes of my chance
(William Shakespeare – Antony
and Cleopatra, Act V, Scene II)

Abstract: The discourse about improvising in music, or about musical acting without preparation – composing, singing, playing, dancing and reacting *right away* by one's own mental and bodily 'movements' – is, as Shakespeare would put it, the discourse about the remaining *live* 'cinders of the spirits', about a 'chance' of the *now* occurrence of a moment, which has already passed, leaving only the 'ashes'. This (meta)discourse, or at least its attempt, about *what* and *why* Valery's 'bird is singing' or, better said, *who* or *what* is *now* singing 'in it', since it cannot resist singing, is the discourse about participation, reaction or *response* in a singular individual occurrence of music.

Key words: improvisation; performativeness; *non-semantic* communication; invention; law; *jouissance*; self; *other* as an order-call; *other* as another man; fantasy principle of music.

Improvising is an inseparable part of the process of creating (composing, performing, listening to and experiencing) music even when that music is not 'pure' improvisation. In view of the fact that extemporizing or improvising implies acting without preparation – composing, singing, playing, dancing, listening and reacting (or following the shaping of a flow of music and its pulse by one's mental and bodily 'movements') right away – it represents the existential situation of the *hic et nunc* (unprepared, non-predetermined, unpredictable and irreversible) participation, reaction or *response* in a singular individual occurrence of music. In other words, a prerequisite for improvising includes the performativeness of music, its 'live occurrence' or 'live performance', as well as the very act of performing and impossibility of its ('live') reversibility. As the process of the *now* occurring, as the very act of utterance or the *activity* itself – enunciation - improvisation is always diegetic in the sense of the existential decisiveness of the moment and place of *expression*. Therefore, improvisation is also a *trace* of the performative situation of the performative itself.¹

Music is a social activity, and remained as such even after the invention of different systems of *notation* and, much later, after the appearance of the gramophone and all subsequent *recorded* sound

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¹ Cf. Eero Tarasti, Signs of Music. A Guide to Musical Semiotics, Berlin, New York, Mouton de Gruyter, 2002, 186.

carriers, which enable the indefinite reproduction of the 'same' – in a specified way, at a specific moment and at a given place, once upon time or a few minutes ago – but already reproduced music. Therefore, mprovising in the social activity of music is based on communication, conditioning it and being conditioned by it. For music is a performance art whose performances are mostly a matter of social events - occasions of 'making music together'. It is a paradigm of 'non-semantic communication' and 'mutual tuning-in relationship', which transcends the barrier of I and thou into the realm of we,² and actually binds the performers who produce music together, as well as the musicians (performers/composers) and their audience.³ Consequently, performance is communication, while improvisation is, either primarily or exclusively, an act of performing. Paradoxically, however, while improvisation can be recorded or even written down, the listener must hear (or see, understand and accept) that this music was created in the now, in the very act of performing. The paradox of a notated or recorded improvisation lies in the fact that one can see or hear only the result or *product* (enunciate) of the discourse and *expression* itself, but not the process of its creation. More precisely, one cannot see or hear the very act of its shaping by communication as the crucial, existential feature of improvisation. In other words, as a special form of communication and an extraordinary feat of coordinating participants - composers/performers and listeners (especially in free improvisation based on the practices of European music avant-garde, American experimental tradition and *free jazz* of the 1960s)⁵ - improvisation 'resides in a spontaneous eruption of social feeling which this sympathetic movement engenders'. Hence, improvisation is also the communication of a communication.

On the other hand, it is clear that creative endeavour begins with inspirational variation, which represents the possible *introduction* to creation, as does the most naïve deviation from the existing models and patterns. We say possible, because such a deviation, that is, the derivation of that same creation, can be a failure. In happening (which also means occurrence, incident or event), it depends, with good reason, on improvisation and the luck of the draw. It attempts to derive the maximum possible from singularity and unrepeatableness, although there is a significant degree of risk of an unsuccessful outcome until 'degree zero' communication, as Roland Barthes would say. Namely, many works of art music which, in their final form, do not seem to be related to the improvisation process, came into existence as

² See: Alfred Schutz, 'Making Music Together', in: Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers: Studies in Social Theory, Vol. II (ed. Arvid Brodersen), The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, 159–178;

³ Cf. Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Music*, Oxford, New York, Clarendon Press, 1997, 438.

⁵ See: Matthew Sansom, 'Improvisation and Identity: A Qualitative Study', Critical Studies in Improvisation / Études critiques en improvisation, 2007, III, 1, 2.:

⁶ Cf. Roger Scruton, op. cit., 439.

⁷ Cf. Miloš Ilić, *Teorija i filozofija stvaralaštva*, Niš, Gradina, 1979, 110.

improvisations, whose first 'editions' or first versions were patiently corrected and refined by their authors a number of times until the final version of the score: a transition from improvisation to composition. Likewise, numerous and, one might say, ingenious, (quasi)improvisations are the result of hard work and preparation, repeated checking, refinement and improvement, so that they give the impression of being improvised (right away) 'on the spot' (a transition from composition to /quasi/improvisation).

However, neither of these paths of creative endeavour diminish the value of the resulting artistic work, but point out that both *happening*, that is, improvisation and first-order spontaneity, as well as *correcto-creation* or *auto-correction* are equally important. Oscillating between maximum certainty in an uncertain paradoxical situation (of improvisation), and counting on maximum uncertainty which is contained in the sketched structure of (its) paradoxical situation, is a matter of art (music, in particular).

Improvisation does not equate, but closely resonates with, notions of intuition, inspiration, imagination, innovation, authenticity, originality, revolutionariness, identity, individual/collective and singular/universal. In addition, it resonates with the situation of a comical paradox or discovery, parody, as well as transgression and the *jouissance* of experience. by means of which it is brought closest to the phenomenon of invention (finding, ingenuity, resourcefulness, creation of something that did not exist before), whose occurrence is possible only if there is a law (rule, norm, order) that is transgressed. If there is no law, it must be invented. To enable an invention or (continuous) transgression of the forbidden, it is necessary, according to Derrida, 'in each situation [...] to invent a law of the singular event'. In continuation of this sentence, Derrida emphasises: '[...inventer la loi de l'événement singulier,] tenir compte du destinataire supposé ou désiré; et en même temps prétendre que cette écriture déterminera le lecteur, lequel apprendra à lire (à 'vivre') cela, qu'il n'était pas habitué à recevoir d'ailleurs', since neither an invention nor a law can exist if there is no *other*, if there is no communication with the *other*.

⁸ Cf. ibid., 271.

⁹ See: Sara Ramshaw, 'Deconstructin(g) Jazz Improvisation: Derrida and the Law of the Singular Event', *Critical Studies in Improvisation / Études critiques en improvisation*, 2006, II, 1, 1–19. Proceeding from an unusual event, which took place during the Paris jazz festival in the summer 1997, when jazz saxophonist Ornette Coleman and French philosopher Jacques Derrida tried to cooperate in improvising one jazz text, the author deals in her study with the unsolved question of the role of improvisation and invention in the law and jazz referring, among other things, to the following Derrida's words from his last interview entitled *Jacques Derrida: 'Je suis en guerre contre moi-même'* [*Jacques Derrida: 'I am at war with myself'*], which was published in *Le Monde* on 19 August 2004: 'Si j'avais inventé mon écriture, je l'aurais fait comme une révolution interminable. Dans chaque situation, il faut créer un mode d'exposition approprié, inventer la loi de l'événement singulier..' ['If I had invented a writing it would have been as an endless revolution. Each situation demands the creation of a suitable mode of exposition, the invention of a law of the singular event...'] (Sara Ramshaw, op. cit., 1, 9).

¹⁰ '[...the invention of a law of the singular event,] take into account the recipient, imagined or desired; and at the same time it demands the belief that this writing will determine the reader, who will learn to read (or to "live") this writing, which he is not used to finding elsewhere' (The Last Interview, Jacques Derrida: 'I am at war with myself', *SV*, November 2004, http://www.studiovisit.net/SV.Derrida.pdf, 21, 8).

The law is invented in order to *recall the other*, invention is the ability of its *finding*, while improvisation is the method of its *opening*. Regardless of whether the otherness of the *other* is another man (*autrui*, akin) or order-call, the opening of the *other* implies both the openness toward the *other* and the call of the *other* to that openness toward him or it, toward the unknown and change. The initiative of the order belongs to the *other*, or the exclusive initiative to call the self to responsiveness is reserved for the *other*, as the one being able to respond.¹¹

It seems that the directness and intensity of 'non-semantic' communication with the *other*, observation, understanding and recognition of oneself in the *other*, which touch and affect one's self-understanding, can be achieved in the strongest, fastest and most profound way in a musical improvisation. This is *instantaneously* most clearly reflected and *very temporarily* manifested (by an eruption of the *jouissance* of experience), not so much in free improvisation (jazz or experimental music) but, rather, in West European art music (without taking into account excursions into the realm of total chance music/aleatoric music). That is, it is most clearly witnessed in the paradoxical situation of improvisation within the musical context: in its relatively rare, fragmented and isolated moments of open occurrence which offer the hope of originality, in the precisely delineated oases and/or reservations of a more or less controlled occurrence which promise the impossible, and in the occurrences hidden in the

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¹¹ Cf. Paul Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre*, Paris, Seuil, 1990 (English edition: Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, transl. by Kathleen Blamey, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992). In this text the Serbian edition of the book was used: Пол Рикер, *Concmbo као други*, translated from French by Спасоје Ћузлан, Београд, Јасен, 2004, 338, 344, 361.

<sup>2004, 338, 344, 361.

12</sup> Non-semantic is understood as the possibility of having no linguistic/semantic meaning or as something that escapes the semantic dimension of the conceptual language. Derrida also speaks about his interest in words as something that is only visual ('...letters representing the spatial visibility of the word...'), or only musical or audible, about the way in which words can become non-discursive, about the way in which 'they can be used to explode discourse' (See: Peter Brunette and David Wills, 'The Spatial Arts: An Interviw with Jacques Derrida', in: Peter Brunette and David Wills /eds./, Deconstruction and the Visual Arts: Art, Media, Architecture, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, 9–32). In this connection, Marcel Cobussen holds that 'music appeals to something that exceeds the semantic part of language; it appeals to non-discursive sonority' (Marcel Cobussen, Scritti Politti, Deconstruction in Music, Interactive Online Diss. Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 2001, http://www.deconstructioninmusic.com/, Para. 5). Cf. Sara Ramshaw, op. cit., 5.

Bakhtin's concept of *carnivalesque*, as part of his philosophy of the act of performing, phenomenon of a live event, implies 'lived life' at carnival time – carnival as a substantive institution of society which keeps it in a state of openness and liberates it from deadening, whose unique sense of time and space (context) causes in each individual the feeling of belonging to the collectivity. During the carnival, all are equal in such a way that all different individual voices are heard, flourishing and interacting in such a way that the voices of others are heard by each individual and everyone inevitably participates in the shaping of the other. See: Mikhail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1993 (otherwise, the study was written in 1941).

form of epiphenomena, calling for the spontaneity of invention. Non-semantic communication is a part of the musical context, into which it has been 'thrown' and surrounded by the network of rules, models, norms, strictly defined relations and laws, enhancing the aporia of its (partly) recorded 'version' and/or recorded performative creation, and the dichotomies between 'forgery' and 'original', illusion and reality, and emphasizing the ambiguity of the notion and position of the author.

Like the enchantment of the impossible (or just the probable) as a paradox, aporia, dichotomy, ambuigity, stepping out, or direct confrontation of differences, improvisation in art music is a call for communication. It is an instantaneous call of the self and a strong response to the otherness of the *other* (in the sense of the metacategory of *otherness* in Ricoeur's hermeneutics); the mutual opening (the awakening of the sleeping 'antennas' of the bodily and mental powers or the invention of the 'new' ones) of all present, visible and invisible participants in the event.

Apart from the common 'external' mobilization of maximum attention, directionality, engagement and putting into 'hot motion' the freedom of participants, the introduction or shift to improvisation also represents an 'inner' multiplication of their beings, whose incoherent, somewhat non-harmonious motivations combine, oscillating rapidly and restlessly, shifting emphasis from one matrix to the other, indulging in a play of difference and chance and the tension of multi-directional and multi-dimensional simultaneous motion. In essence, this *carnivalesque* (in the Bakhtinian sense of the word) dimension of improvisation or the specific context of communication which it demands, assumes the establishment of the situation in which the prescribed and customary conventions are cancelled or reversed, and real (natural, true, sincere) dialogue becomes possible.¹³

Thus, the state of flux which we call an improvisation play occurs between opposing situations – everything is possible and nothing is impossible. Paradoxically, improvisation in the art music of different periods raises questions of whether improvisation is an illusion, because it seems to be something it is not, or a secret, because it does not seem to be what it actually is. Instrumental (primarily organ) improvisation (of a fugue, for example); 'preluding'; capriccio; the embellishments of an aria; virtuosic vocal cadenza in an opera; cadenzas in a concerto; improvisation on a given theme-object (based on the model of, say, a serious, gallant, capriccio style, waltz, march, rondo, or the style of a certain composer); improvisation as a gesture, or the movement of expression (in the style of folk music and/or folklore improvisation performance, among other things);¹⁴ improvisation as the method of 'building blocks'; as the principle of a controlled freedom or an organized chance, that is, as the method of controlled chance music/limited aleatory music are some forms of its manifestation. Those passages and moments of improvisation can expand 'from within' in a rhizome-like way and move 'back' and 'forth' along a flow

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¹⁴ For more detail see: Eero Tarasti, op. cit., 189–194 (i.e. the chapter entitled 'Improvisation as signification: A peircean view').

of music, while concurrently permeating the music unnoticeably but irresistibly, thus conditioning potential compositional, technical, linguistic, formal, and stylistic 'dissolutions' and 'ramifications'.

However, the greatest impact of its 'slippery' moments is in the field of musical fantasy (*free* or improvisation fantasy) and the fantasy principle in music in general. All those designated and undesignated *ad libitum* and *quasi una fantasia* passages – in which the '*rubato* spaces' of a specific individual way of '*ad libitum* breathing' of a musical flow are opened, and where released musical relationships set out, from the domain of unconscious compulsions, to 'crystallize' the music flux in a specific improvisational way – emanate the *other* logic, *other* thinking, or *other* 'hidden' law of 'work without rules' (or the work of unconscious rules), violating the laws of stylistically specific and formal patterns. This crystallization resists the established *symbolic order* (that is, the 'medium' plane structures) which is structured like a language, and whose laws, contracts and restrictions control the rules of musical communication.¹⁵

The processes of musical flow 'breathing' are primarily related to tempo, speed (or speeds) of unfolding a musical flow or musical time, deceleration and acceleration, as well as dynamics, agogics and articulation, as the crucial factors of tension-related movements (cf. ibid.).

It is the question of the laws governing musical language and the tonal systems, techniques, features of the elements at the 'phonetic' level, 'grammatical' rules, formalized methods of structuring musical patterns and standardized formal types being characteristic of a specified period (see: ibid.).

¹⁵ It is primarily thought of in regard to the period from the late 15th century to the present day or, in other words, from the moment when the term 'fantasy', with a specific musical meaning, began to be used in music. Over the years, this meaning, depending on the context, has manifested itself as: *improvising* on an instrument (lute, organ, cembalo...), and within an instrumental ensemble; the culmination of the imitation technique and measure of counterpoint ability (or the Bakhtinian concept of possible genuine polyphony of fully valid voices); a composition in which all freedoms are allowed, which has one theme that is repeated in a modified form (in inversion, augmentation, rhythmically transformed, with dissonances, moving faster or slower, with proportionate relations, or in disproportion), showing a variety of work with one material, or being based on different materials; a parody fantasy which initial material has been borrowed (from the motet, mass, chanson, madrigal or some other fantasy...); the possibility of using any (spiritual or secular) melody, cantus firmus, or the technique of paraphrase; the freedom of a musician to freely express any of his inspirations; the freedom of rhythm and tempo, expanding to the point of disregarding barlines (the nonexistence of the metre designation), or their potentially great permeability; the unlimited use of the possibilities of instruments, as well as an unrestricted instrumental and vocal virtuosity; a 'risky' harmonic thinking and the audacity of modulations; a free musical style (the emancipation from all laws of harmony, formal shaping and thematic supports); a free 'total' arabesque; emphasizing (seemingly) elemental, obsessively destructive, forced, 'collectively' regressive processes and techniques of music creation, which invoke the unconscious, suppressed, pagan or, better said, a ritual-magic 'musical act'; a combination of instant elements (as a repertory of elements); an inter-textual musical situation; 'aleatory of the texture' and 'collective rhythmical ad libitum music making' (controlled aleatory music in the fields of rhythm, metre and tempo, whereby the restratification of different voices, entrusted with rubato playing, is carried out in such a way that they remain completely independent in that unstable, unsteady and movable sound texture); specific changes in sound-colouristic images (strata) in the music of sound colours or, more exactly, developing of sound and the possibility of dealing with the very structure of the sound in general. See: Tijana Popović Mladjenović, Procesi panstilističkog muzičkog mišljenja (Processes of Panstylistic Musical Thinking, Chapter V - 'Φαντασόσ je Phántasos je Fantaz', 445–536), PhD thesis defended in 2007 (in press, forthcoming 2009).

Improvisation involves the transgression, violation or overstepping of a law, the *jouissance* of violating laws and rules, which are primarily matters of style, specified systems and musical conventions, and the true Durandian *beginning of emancipation*. Accordingly, it represents the intensification of those primary, generic processes (of the musical *unconscious*), or the processes related to the panstylistic dimension of musical thinking that is dominated by *other* laws that cannot be generalized or formulated like general rules. Namely, the nature of those other 'hidden laws', hidden by definition and from definition, is identified only after completing the compositional, interpretative, perceptive and/or improvisation process and when music and/or its existence are realized in sound. This means that the laws governing the processes of musical creation are hidden in the processes themselves. Namely, during the conception of the music, these laws do not exist or, better said, *they still do not exist*. In such a context, the primary, generic processes of musical thinking are the *processes of inventing the laws* which govern them, and which act through the final musical pattern as the hidden sense controlling a singular, individual creative process applied only once, in the case of a specific, individual musical composition.

If music, like art in general, is an 'externalized dream', ¹⁶ if the primary processes of musical thinking belong to the realm of musical relationships (those pre-symbolic, pre-lingual, pre-language relationships) that stimulate and free the fantasy principle of music *par excellence*, if they belong to the realm of unconscious coercions or constraints which, potentially, have the possibility to fragment and immediately return to harmonious balance, improvisation is a singular method of *opening* the *self/other* polarity and placing it in a dynamic context. ¹⁷ Improvisation is the process of *responding by the other*,

¹⁶ As one of the most universal creative potentials, fantasy is also interpreted as a 'daydream', which is close to the interpretation of art as an externalized dream – a higher-order dream in the sense of the consensus of the brain subsystem in an external action (see: Predrag Ognjenović, *Psihološka teorija umetnosti*, Belgrade, Gutenbergova galaksija, 2003; the chapters entitled 'Teorija dinamičkih kompetenci o snu' and 'Teorija dinamičkih kompetenci o umetnosti').

¹⁷ According to Zuckerkandl, music is a *live motion*, that is, a kind of pure motion which can be realised in thoughts (since thinking time in the form of tones is the only form how one can think about time). In music there is no existence, on one side, and thinking about it, on the other. Thinking in terms of the motion of tones is thinking which, in itself, creates existence. Musical thinking generates existence. And hearing music means *hearing an emotion* (cf. Victor Zuckerkandl, *Man the Musician. Sound and Symbol*, Vol. II, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973, 248, 142). Similarly, Storr regards music as the image of an *inner life flow*, as the train of consciousness, or primarily the stream of the unconscious. In addition, in contrast to other domains of the mind, music touches our emotions in such a way that they draw the body along with them, which feelings do not do. Being personally more significant than other mental powers, music is more relevant for the tides and ebbs of our subjective and fragile life. Thus, *the motion and emotion* are also inseparably linked in music and by music (cf: Anthony Storr, *Music and the Mind*, New York, Ballantine Books, 1992, 174, 182–185). See: Tijana Popović Mladjenović, op. cit.

both the *autrui* (otherness of akin) and *autre* (otherness of order-call), a kind of direct communication where even the greatest splits are also possible. Through improvisation, the border with the *other* is lost, the *différance* is preserved, while the sublimation, catharsis and regression in the service of *we*, and/or the imaginary, symbolic and realistic in the function of *jouissance*, converge and permeate.

Translated by author

САЖЕТАК

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ИМПРОВИЗАЦИЈА КАО ПОЗИВ НА КОМУНИКАЦИЈУ

Музика као извођачка уметност, чија су извођења (у највећем броју случајева) ствар друштвеног збивања — парадигма "несемантичке комуникације" и "узајамног подешавања везе", јесте комуникација, а импровизације је пре свега, или, искључиво, извођење. Дакле, импровизација као *траг* перформативне ситуације самог перформатива, и као комуникација комуникације, блиско резонира, али се не поистовећује, са појмовима као што су интуиција, инспирација, имагинација, иновација, аутентичност, оригиналност, идентитет. У вези са ситуацијом трансгресије и *jouissance* искуства, највише се приближава феномену инвенције чије је догађање могуће једино под условом постојања неког закона (правила, норме, реда) који она трансгресира. А ни инвенција, ни закон не постоје уколико не постоји *други*, односно комуникација са *другим*. Закон се и измишља да би се онај *други призвао*, инвенција јесте способност његовог *проналажења*, а импровизација начин његовог *отварања*.

Непосредност и интензитет несемантичке комуникације са *другим* (без обзира да ли је другост *другог* – други човек /аиtrui, ближњи/ или налог-позив), опажање, сазнавање и препознавање себе самог у *другоме* који дотиче и погађа саморазумевање сопства, најснажније, најбрже и најдубље се остварује, чини се, управо у музичкој импровизацији. То се *тренутно* најјасније огледа и *врло привремено* испољава (ерупцијом *jouissance* доживљаја), не толико у слободној импровизацији (у џезу или експерименталној музици), колико у западноевропској уметничкој музици, то јест, у парадоксалној ситуацији импровизације – у њеним релативно ретким, фрагментарним и изолованим тренуцима отвореног дешавања. Наиме, импровизација се у уметничкој музици јавља као вишестурки позив на комуникацију, као моментално позивање сопства и снажно одазивање другости *другог*, као међусобно отварање свих присутних, видљивих и невидљивих (екстериорних ближњих и интериорних налога-позива) учесника тог догађаја. Та "карневалска" (*саrnivalesque*) димензија импровизације, тај специфичан контекст комуникације коју она захтева, у суштини претпоставља успостављање прага ситуације у којој се прописане уобичајене конвенције поништавају или преокрећу, а прави дијалог постаје могућ.

Превирање које називамо импровизационом игром, то јест, елементи импровизационог процеса неретко условљавају бројна и различита музичка композиционо-техничко-језичкоформално-стилска "растварања" и "грањања", а њихово највеће дејство везује се за поље музичке фантазије и за фантазијски принцип у музици уопште. Сва она означена и неозначена *ad libitum* и *quasi una fantasia* места – у којима се отварају "*rubato* простори" специфичног "*ad libitum* дисања" музичког тока и где се ослобађају музичке релације које из домена несвесних принуда крећу да га на самосвојан, импровизациони начин "кристалишу" – еманирају ону *другу* логику, *друго*

мишљење, *други* "скривени" закон "рада без правила" (односно, рада несвесних правила) који крши законе стилски специфичних и формалних образаца, наиме, опире се законима, уговорима и рестрикцијама устаљеног *симболичког реда* који контролишу правила музичке комуникације.

Као начин трансгресије, преступа, прекорачења закона, као *jouissance* кршења закона и правила који су пре свега ствар стилова, одређених система и музичких конвенција, као *почетак ослобађања* — импровизација представља интензивирање деловања оних примарних, генеричких процеса (музичког *несвесног*), наиме, процеса панстилистичке димензије музичког мишљења. Тако је импровизација као ситуација "тражења закона јединственог догађаја" (и/или непосредног исписивања кривуље тонуса еруптивних сила емоција и експресије), увек наново јединствен начин *отварања* поларона *self/other*, који се ставља у динамички процес, односно, *одазивања другог*, и оног *autrui* (другост ближњег), и оног *autre* (другост налога-позива), наиме врста најнепосредније комуникације у којој су могући и највећи расцепи, као и губљење границе са *другим*, у којој се чува *différance*, а сустичу и прожимају сублимација, катарза и регресија у служби "ми", и/или имагинарно, симболичко и реално у функцији *jouissance*.